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Akey element in all national andlocal transport policies addressingenvironmental goals is the devel-
opment of attractive and popular public
transport systems as an alternative to
car travel. This often requires major in-
vestment when already stretched tradi-
tional public spending levels are equally
needed by other sectors, and when elec-
torates are reacting against paying
higher taxes.
At the same time, it is widely ac-
cepted that property, or more accurately
land values, rise when transport access
to a site is improved. In theory there-
fore, perhaps the most obvious solution
would be to have the beneficiaries – the
landowners – return at least some of
that financial windfall to whoever pro-
vided it. 
The idea of public transport opera-
tors recouping some of their costs from
the value gained by landowners from
improved access, is not new. Indeed,
such a method was applied in London
during the nineteenth century, when
the Metropolitan Railway Company
bought undeveloped land parcels
alongside its planned extension into
Buckinghamshire and developed them.
When each section of the Metropolitan
Line (now part of the London Under-
ground system) was opened, the values
of these land parcels increased and so
were sold at a profit that part covered
the cost of both building the railway
and developing the parcels.
But, this approach became less com-
mon once public money began to re-
place private capital as the major
source of funding for new railway infra-
structure. As a result, the linkage be-
tween the provision of transport infra-
structure and land use development
was largely broken. Currently the only
mechanism that maintains this con-
cept, albeit in a watered down form, is
through developer agreements under
Section 106 of the 1990 Town and
Country Planning Act or Section 75 in
the Town and Country Planning (Scot-
land) Act 1997. However, developer
agreements are extremely limited in
what they can recoup, and councils are
only able to negotiate for money that
will be directly used to mitigate adverse
transport impacts imposed by the de-
velopment. 
There are, however, some public
transport developments in the UK and
abroad that maintain a more direct link
between transport and land use. This
article reviews some of these to indicate
the sort of funding potential land use
value capture can achieve. 
RECOUPING COSTS ON
THE DOCKLANDS LIGHT
RAILWAY, LONDON, UK
One attempt in the UK to use the cap-
ture of land use values to fund public
transport occurred in East London dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
was as part of the regeneration of the
Royal Docks site owned by the London
Docklands Development Corporation
(LDDC). Under special urban develop-
ment corporation powers, the LDDC
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both provided infrastructure and ser-
viced development land, selling off
sites to private companies. These inte-
grated land use/transport powers made
possible the plan to fund the Beckton
extension of the Docklands Light Rail-
way (DLR) by the increases in land val-
ues anticipated in the development
area. The sites, owned by the LDDC,
could then be sold at a profit and so fi-
nance the railway.
Unfortunately, although the line was
built, the three huge consortia lined up
to develop the Royal Docks area pulled
out due to the economic downturn of
the early 1990s. As a result, virtually
nothing was constructed until seven
years after the line opened when the
University of East London and the
ExCel Exhibition Centre sites were fi-
nally developed. By then, the LDDC
had ceased to exist and the DLR fran-
chised. Land ownership and transport
infrastructure development has been
split apart and so the basis of capturing
land value rises no longer existed.
Overall, the DLR scheme illustrates the
importance of timing when linking
land values to financing public trans-
port schemes. After all, the scheme
may well have worked had it been im-
plemented ten years earlier. But, such
UK cases have proved the exception,
and if one is really to see how such
schemes might work in practice, one is
forced to look abroad, where two
schemes in particular, in Hong Kong
and Copenhagen, stand out. 
SELLING DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS, MTR, HONG
KONG
Perhaps the most successful body at
raising finance from capturing increases
in land values in recent years, is the
Mass Transit Railway (MTR) in Hong
Kong. Between the establishment of the
MTR in 1975 and 1986, three urban
rail lines – Kun Tong, Tsuen Wan and
Island – were built. These covered
43km and 38 stations and carried 2.3
million passengers in 1997. To this was
added in July 1998, the 35km Lantau
Airport Railway, linking Hong Kong Is-
land and the international airport at
Chek Lap Kok, while the 13km, six sta-
tion Tseung Kwan O extension which
opened in August 2002. 
The Hong Kong MTR does not re-
ceive any subsidy from the Govern-
ment, covering 80% of its operating
costs from the farebox and the rest by
profits from property development.
This is possible because the Govern-
ment owns all the land in Hong Kong
which it leases for 50 or sometimes 70
years. Developers pay a premium for
land for 50-year periods, based on a cal-
culation that looks at the value of the
land possible from future development,
which may be paid up front or in instal-
ments. Thus the Government can as-
sign land next to and above stations
and depots for the MTR to develop. 
To do this, the corporation seeks to
limit its risk by finding developer part-
ners who pay for all the ‘land premium
charge’ and construction costs. In re-
turn, MTR gives the developer permis-
sion to develop the site. Thus there is
very little cash outlay required from the
MTR, and profits are earned through
sharing the development income, or
else through receiving part of the as-
sets in kind, for example a shopping
centre. From this generated income,
together with revenue from leasing
and managing selected property, the
construction costs for new metro ex-
tensions are covered.
This funding mechanism is central to
the whole planning process of new
metro lines. When assessing a new rail
line, MTR expects to make a return of
10%-11%. This ‘hurdle rate’ is the re-
quired or expected rate of return
needed to cover the cost of capital, and
to give profit to MTR’s shareholders.
The level of risk and the profit margin
are also taken into account. 
Firstly, a feasibility study is con-
ducted. This calculates the project cost,
and the patronage and revenue, and
then addresses any ‘financial shortfall’
by suggesting suitable sites for property
developments that the Government
could hand over to MTR . Once the po-
tential of the line has been assessed,
and the route agreed with Government,
MTR produces plans for the develop-
ment – siting where necessary services
are to be built, such as schools, hospi-
tals etc – before they are submitted to
the usual planning approval process. 
With the Government’s backing se-
cured, the engineers build founda-
tions for the stations along the route.
At the same time the approvals, gener-
ally airspace development rights, are
divided into financially and techni-
cally feasible packages, at sizes afford-
able to property developers and fi-
nanciers and offered to the market
through a tendering process. Expres-
sions of interest are then requested
and the ‘best fit’ developer is selected,
who then must pay a down payment
to cover up front costs (eg foundations
for property above a station). MTR
meanwhile negotiates a 50-year lease.
The developer then constructs the
building and sells it. After the sale, 20-
25% of any profit is taken by MTR. If
there is a loss, this is all borne by the
developer. MTR takes no risk. 
One further aspect is that while the
railway must be completed to the
timetable set by Government, MTR re-
tains the right to decide when to nego-
tiate with the private developers. This
flexibility allows MTR to maximise its
potential return by choosing to go
ahead when economic conditions are at
their most favourable. As a rule, the
new developments have tended to
open two to three years after the rail-
way line.
Where there are developments above
stations, MTR also helps manage the
property. For example, the shops above
MTR’s first development, Telford Plaza
at Kowloon Tong station, are owned
and managed by MTR. As well as pro-
viding a significant revenue stream, this
allows a continuing co-ordinated man-
agement of the railway operation 
– property development interface.
From the three urban lines, 18 prop-
erty sites were developed, consisting of
28,000 apartments in ten estates,
150,500 square metres of retail in three
shopping centres (each located above a
train depot), and 128,500 square metres
of office space. MTR retains the man-
agement of all of this development. Fi-
nancially, the profits from the sites to-
talled $HK4bn  (£336m), approximately
18% of the cost of the three lines. In
1998, the rental and fees from the man-
aged properties was $HK697m (£59m) -
approximately 10% of the MTR’s total
revenue.
With the Airport Railway, the scope
for development was drastically in-
creased. Five development sites at Hong
Kong, Kowloon, Olympic, Tsing Yi and
Tung Chung stations are being devel-
oped, amounting to 25,000 apartments,
11 office towers, six shopping centres
and nine hotels. These developments
were split into 15 separate packages,
and are being completed progressively
between 1998 and 2005. It is predicted
that between $HK15bn and $HK20bn
(£1.3bn-£1.7bn) will be raised from de-
velopers, contributing over half of the
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$HK35.1bn (£2.9bn) construction cost. 
Meanwhile the $HK26bn (£2.2bn)
Tseung Kwan O extension is to serve a
new town of 500,000 people, and in-
clude 28,000 apartments, 100,000
square metres of office space and
132,000 square metres of local and dis-
trict shopping centres, as well as
schools, open space and other commu-
nity facilities. Altogether, the property
development fees for the extension are
estimated to represent an investment
cost of $HK80bn (£6.7n).
Planning is also taking place for other
extensions to the railway in East
Kowloon and Hong Kong Island which
all include significant elements of prop-
erty development.
In conclusion, there are a number of
reasons behind the success of the fi-
nancing route.
The first is that new lines are only
funded through highly populated areas
where existing demand is enough to
guarantee that the line will be well
used. In other words, new lines are only
considered if they are almost guaran-
teed not to make a loss. This was not
the case in East London, nor is it true in
Copenhagen, where the building of a
new line is primarily aimed at kick start-
ing economic regeneration. In Hong
Kong, any regeneration benefits are
seen as being positive spin offs rather
than a core objective.
Secondly, the assumptions made
when calculating the financial returns
from the project are extremely conserv-
ative and err heavily towards the worst
case situation, and thirdly the contracts
issued by the MTR passes all the risk to
its private developer partners while
maintaining a share in any profits.
On top of these reasons, Hong Kong
is obviously a special case. A relatively
tiny land area coupled with a rapidly
growing economy and population, has
led to a massive demand for land,
which even remained, albeit a slower
rate, during the recent Asian economic
downturn.
USING LAND VALUE TAXES
TO FUND THE
ØRESTADSBANEN,
COPENHAGEN, DENMARK
The second example is where land sales
and a land value tax are to be used to
capture benefits arising from the
Ørestadsbanen automated light rail sys-
tem in the Ørestad area to the south of
Copenhagen in Denmark.
This project came about because in
1992 the City of Copenhagen was in re-
cession and so it requested more money
from the National Government. How-
ever, instead of providing the City with
more money, the Government handed
over its share of a long thin 310-hectare
site for development. The logic behind
this was that this stretch of undevel-
oped land lies in a prime location but
was almost inaccessible. By providing a
high quality public transport link, the
site could then be sold thus not only re-
generating part of the city, but recaptur-
ing the development and construction
costs too. Ironically, the concept for the
scheme was developed from the experi-
ence of the development of the London
Docklands area described earlier.
Co-owned by the City of Copen-
hagen (55%) and the Danish Govern-
ment (45%) since 1963, the ownership
of the Ørestad area was transferred to a
new development agency/company
called Ørestadsselskabet (OS) (Ørestad
Development Corporation) in March
1993, and a plan for its development
drawn up shortly after. When com-
pleted, it is intended that around
80,000 jobs would be created at a num-
ber of sites in a large shopping centre,
several offices, and a number of public
sector developments, including a uni-
versity, Government offices, and a tele-
vision station. In addition, it is planned
that 20,000 people will live in the area. 
Ultimately, the Ørestadsbanen auto-
mated LRT system will operate a three-
minute frequency to the city-centre
(built and managed by OS), while the
other lines to Frederiksberg and the air-
port, will be developed by OS in part-
nership with the relevant local authori-
ties. The 22km system will be operated
as a single unit, with the operator se-
lected by OS through competitive ten-
dering. The first section is expected to
open in October 2002, while the second
phase (70% owned by OS and 30% by
the Municipality of Fredriksberg), is set
to follow in May 2003. The third phase
(owned 55% by OS and 45% by the City
of Copenhagen) should open in 2005.
There has been a delay in opening
the line and predicted costs have in-
creased from around DKK6bn (£566m )
in 1996 to DKK10.8bn (£1bn) now. 
As noted earlier, the Ørestadsbanen
automated light rail system project is to
be financed by realising the increase in
the value of land that the system will
generate. This is to be done by selling
the newly developed land and by col-
lecting a land value tax , but to do this
the scheme first had to be developed,
meaning that the metro is currently
being funded through Government and
other loans. 
Conditions for success
From the cases described, it is clear that
there are several key factors that must
be taken into account. The first major
lesson is that somehow the public sec-
tor needs to own or somehow control
the development land. In the Dock-
lands, Hong Kong and Copenhagen sit-
uations, the land was Government
owned and therefore it was possible to
implement such a mechanism rela-
tively easily. This may be problematic in
other UK schemes, because while it is
possible for Government agencies to
compulsory purchase land needed for
new infrastructure, it is less easy to ob-
tain ‘extra’ land.
Secondly, the actual mechanism for
capturing the benefits from the private
sector needs to be in place. For example,
both Hong Kong and Denmark have
collected land value taxes for many
years, which are able to capture any in-
creases in value without any new legis-
lation being necessary. In Britain, in-
creases in value could only currently be
collected from selling the newly devel-
oped land for a premium.
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Thirdly, positive government in-
volvement, with close co-ordination of
policy-making, is another crucial ele-
ment, while Governments also have an
important role to play in establishing
the legal framework for a smooth trans-
fer of development benefits to the rail-
way operator. This is evident in both
the Danish and Hong Kong schemes. 
Finally, the timing of the project is of
the utmost importance. Specifically,
problems can be encountered if devel-
opment slows due to an economic re-
cession. And, if a new metro system is
being built it must be ready for when
the new buildings open for business,
but should not open too much before
that happens.
Seemingly, this has not been the case
in Copenhagen and was certainly not
the case in Docklands. Bluntly, in the
Docklands case, the planned route sim-
ply did not serve a large enough exist-
ing market so that when the recession
hit, the line was not as successful as it
should have been. In Copenhagen,
while the line is due to open in October
2002, there is as yet very little develop-
ment and consequently little existing
demand. As a result, the system is
highly dependent on the planned de-
velopments being built as quickly as
possible – not an ideal situation given
the experience in East London. Even in
a very densely populated city such as
Hong Kong, the mechanism was not
primarily used as an instrument to eco-
nomically regenerate a deprived area.
Indeed, policy makers there have taken
a great deal of care to ensure that any
new lines can already be financially jus-
tified by existing patronage levels. In
addition, they use extremely conserva-
tive estimates about how patronage
and property values will grow and
then pass all the financial risk onto the
developers. 
Practically therefore, joint urban
rail/land development schemes must be
based on a long-term strategy to ensure
that sufficient time is allowed so that a
significant share of the external values
generated by the improved rail service
can be captured. This is recognised in
Hong Kong, where MTR is given the
flexibility to decide when exactly it
should develop its land in order to get
the best financial return. 
PROSPECTS FOR PUBLIC
TRANSPORT OPERATORS
CAPTURING VALUE IN THE
UK
The prospects for a land value capture
mechanism being used in Britain in the
near future are not good. Although
public private partnerships are politi-
cally very much in vogue, the complex-
ity of the transport and land use
‘providers’ working together over sev-
eral years without any real strategic
framework presents a real barrier. And,
when combined with the lack of a land
value tax to capture any betterment
and the difficulties in planning trans-
port infrastructure even without the
added problems of finding suitable
sites to develop, the chances look even
slimmer.
But, despite these pitfalls, in Edin-
burgh a private company called ‘E-Rail’
is currently in discussions with the local
authority to part finance the reopening
of the city’s south suburban rail line to
passenger traffic, through gains in land
value made when the line opens. We
can only wait and see as to whether the
theory can work out in practice.
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